

**Center for
Army
Lessons
Learned**

BULLETIN

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INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY



PEACETIME CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS



COMBATTING TERRORISM



PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION TO LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

**CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED
COMBINED ARMS TRAINING ACTIVITY
FORT LEAVENWORTH**

PREFACE

Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) is one of the most confusing and ignored areas of modern military thought. The current doctrine is not well distributed to the field or understood throughout the Army. Commanders have requested a document which covers the emerging doctrine in a concise, readable manner and begins to disseminate the valuable points of ongoing operations in LIC.

This bulletin reviews the emerging doctrine as an introduction to the overall context of LIC, and forms the basis for a future series of bulletins (Just Cause, Nimrod Dancer, etc.) which will focus more specifically on tactical lessons learned. This publication is not an attempt to repeat doctrine. Rather it relates emerging doctrine to current operations and lessons learned. It is written for leaders and staff at all levels who may find themselves involved in a LIC.

We are entering a dynamic period for the Armed Forces and particularly for the U.S. Army. The sweeping changes in the high-intensity battlefield of Europe and the ever increasing problems in the Third World are making contingency operations the subject of a new shift in emphasis. These changes will affect every soldier in the Army, and require that we pay close attention to the developing doctrine and lessons learned. This is a start point in providing LIC information Armywide.

This bulletin will:

- ! Outline a framework for placing LIC into its proper global and national security perspective.
- ! Discuss the imperatives of LIC in relation to historical examples.
- ! Examine the four operational categories of LIC with historical examples.
- ! Highlight general lessons learned in LIC.

Compiled in this bulletin are the major points of FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, several briefings, and many articles addressing the subject. It provides a concise, conceptual framework for reference and further study of LIC.

James M. Lyle

Brigadier General, USA Commanding

INTRODUCTION TO LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

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This bulletin was compiled and edited by Major David J. Schroer.

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Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both are intended.

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INTRODUCTION

". . . But the fact remains that the most likely real thing that they will see ... is Low Intensity Conflict. And while the strokes and rewards. . . will be there for them to focus on these other things. . . the combat training center. . . that if they are called to respond to one of these damn things, that they cannot afford to fail. They could have been the greatest battalion commander that ever went thru NTC or JRTC.. . but the minute that there is one kid lying on the ground bleeding unnecessarily or. . . that their nation and their Army is embarrassed because of something they did--They will know that they made the wrong choices in terms of where they put their time, efforts, and energies.

"When I was a student at Leavenworth, I said that is too complicated, there are no rules in it, ... it's too much an art and not much of a science. It's too unpredictable and uncontrollable, it's too tough. And, by the way, the chances are so low that I'm going to have to do any of that.

"And then there I was . . . What, now, Regimental Commander??"

"We put LIC in the too hard box."

COL David Hale ¹
TF Commander
Operation Nimrod Dancer
November 1989

Several military and political elements combine to ensure LIC is the most likely form of confrontation the U.S. Army will face in the near future.

- ! The capabilities of the superpowers, both nuclear and non-nuclear, and the ability to project them around the world, have made high-intensity conflict too costly.
- ! The deep social, economic, and political problems of Third World nations create fertile ground for developing insurgencies and other conflicts which impact adversely on U.S. interests.
- ! Finally, the huge economic and social impact of the international drug business all point to an expanding U.S. involvement in the LIC arena.

Soldiers at all levels have had difficulty in deciphering their particular role in LIC.

- ! Some commanders and civilian leaders have stated LIC is strictly a Special Forces or Light Infantry problem.
- ! In reality, nothing could be further from the truth. Although some geographic areas are more likely hot spots than others, LIC could involve every branch of the Army in any one of the theaters.

Ongoing operations in Panama indicate the need for a mix of forces (Heavy/Light/SOF) and dramatically reinforced combat support and combat service support elements. Operation Nimrod Dancer deployed an infantry brigade task force from 7th INF DIV with a mech infantry battalion from 5th INF DIV to protect U.S. citizens and possessions, and perform a show of force in Panama for 6 months in 1989.

! An Armor, Mech Infantry, Military Police, or Transportation officer who was firmly convinced that LIC was the province of some light force could find himself knee-deep in a deployment he knows little about.

Further complicating matters is the reversal in LIC of the long accepted predominant role of maneuver units. To illustrate this point and the radical departure from earlier doctrine:

! The truism from WW II that every engineer and civil affairs soldier may be pressed into service as a rifleman is modified for LIC operations to read every rifleman may be pressed into service as an engineer or civil affairs soldier.

!

To better understand this, one should examine the nature of LIC in relation to the entire operational continuum.

THE OPERATIONAL CONTINUUM

Routine Peaceful Competition is the norm and desired end state. The states of the world pursue their own interests, sometimes in harmony, but with enough commonality of interests to avoid violence. The military instrument of national power, although primarily focused on deterring war, is employed in support of political, economic, and informational efforts to achieve U.S. goals and help preserve this peacefully competitive environment.²

This is the relationship of nations, both internally and externally, during what is commonly referred to as "peacetime".

Low Intensity Conflict is a politico-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine peaceful competition among nations. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged over a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications.³

Figure 1 depicts the operational continuum outlining where LIC falls within the spectrum. The accompanying characteristics can be determined by picking a point on the graph. For instance, by drawing a line directly up and down through the "C" in LIC ENVIRONMENT, many elements about a conflict at that point on the continuum can be ascertained. Reading the chart from top to bottom, the consequences of this conflict would be relatively minor and it could include peacekeeping, peacetime contingencies and/or combating terrorism. Finally its relative probability of occurrence is high.

View this continuum (Figure 1) with ill-defined boundaries between categories and the ability to have simultaneous levels of conflict within a given situation. For example, in Vietnam conventional U.S. Forces were battling conventional North Vietnamese Forces in a mid-intensity conflict in one area, while at the same time U.S. Special Forces were conducting Unconventional Warfare and Civic Action in other areas.




Figure 1⁴

- ! It is possible to jump across the continuum, either escalating or decreasing the proportion of the conflict without stopping at intermediate points on the scale.
- ! It is likely that the cessation of hostilities at one level will result, not in the resumption of routine peaceful competition, but a move to some level of LIC. This was the case following conclusion of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, with the 1982 Camp David Accords resulting in the ongoing UN Peacekeeping operations in the Sinai.
- ! The common thread throughout the range of conflict is a strategic aim of a faction or force against the legitimate government of a nation.
- ! In mid-and high-intensity conflict, military force contributes through direct operations to the achievement of the strategic aim. The objective is defeat of the other side militarily.
- ! LIC uses military force generally indirectly to support the strategic aim, with an objective that is political-military and supports some other focus of power.

In reviewing this continuum, keep the role of civil authority in perspective. By examining the imperatives of low intensity conflict (see Historical Perspective - Malaya 1948), the necessity for the primacy of civil authority becomes clearer.

- ! Military power is only one instrument of an integrated solution to a LIC.
- ! Equally important are other facets including economic, informational, and diplomatic.

U.S. military operations in LIC will primarily support non-military actions. These actions are part of an overall country plan which supports both the U.S. and host nation's political objectives. Example: an engineer battalion may deploy to conduct in-theater training by building a section of highway through dense mountainous terrain. The highway, in turn, supports the economic growth of the region and promotes the esteem and effectiveness of the host nation government.

"U.S. Forces will not in general be combatants. A combat role for U.S. Armed Forces in Third World conflicts has to be viewed as an exceptional event. Some exceptions will doubtless occur, as in 1983 in Grenada and 1986 in Libya, and it would be self-defeating for the United States to declare a 'No Use' doctrine for its forces in the Third World. But our forces' principle role there will be to augment U.S. Security Assistance Programs. Mainly that means providing military training, technical training and intelligence and logistical support."

Discriminate Deterrence⁵
Report of Commission on Integrated
Long-Term Strategy

OPERATIONAL LESSONS LEARNED

CIVIL AUTHORITY

- ! The overall control by civil authority in LIC is paramount.
- ! All military operations must fit within the context of an overall country/regional plan.
- ! This requires a fundamental mental shift and focus when dealing with LIC.
- ! Conflict or violence does not always imply or even permit a uniquely military solution with accompanying military control.
- ! Conflict will often involve determining implied intermediate political objectives, which will require the support of military forces and operations to achieve.

UNIT TRAINING

- ! Keep the primary mission (force protection, peacekeeping observer, etc.) of the unit in the forefront, with consideration given to other unit-desired training as a side benefit only.
- ! Often a relationship exists between fulfilling mission requirements and conducting useful unit training (as in the previous engineer example).
- ! Low intensity does not equal low interest. Approach LIC missions and pre-mission training with the same sense of purpose as combat in Central Europe (High Intensity).

IMPERATIVES OF LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

There are five imperatives common to each of the diverse operational categories in LIC(see LIC Operational Categories). View them as a checklist for establishing a mental framework when approaching specified and implied missions.

- ! **Political Dominance:** Civil authority and political objectives drive military decisions at every level. These political objectives must be understood, as they impact on military operations, and influence selected courses of action. Unorthodox courses of action/methods may result. ⁶
- ! **Unity of Effort:** Consider how actions integrate with, and contribute to initiatives of other governmental agencies. Interagency coordination is critical. Commanders may answer to civilian chiefs or employ the resources of civilian agencies.⁷
- ! **Adaptability:** The skill and willingness to change or modify structures and methods to accommodate different situations. It is more than merely tailoring or flexibility of common techniques and organizations, but development of new ones appropriate to each situation.⁸
- ! **Legitimacy:** The willing acceptance by the governed of the right of the government to govern and enforce decisions. It comes from the belief that authority is genuine, effective, and uses the proper agencies for reasonable purposes. Legitimacy is the central concern of all parties involved in a conflict.⁹
- ! **Perseverance:** LIC by nature involves protracted struggles. Perseverance requires careful, informed analysis to select the right time and place for decisive action. Commanders must reject minor, short term successes in favor of long-range goals.¹⁰

All of the factors must be addressed because they are mutually supporting. Lack of attention to one will cause failure of the whole. It is easy to see that great resources can be devoted to a campaign that embraces the imperatives of political dominance, adaptability, legitimacy and perseverance, yet ignores unity of effort. This plan would fragment critical resources and be doomed to failure, the same as piecemealing a maneuver force in an attack.

The following historical example will address and illustrate each of these imperatives.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE - MALAYA 1948

The pre-war political instability in the British Empire continued at an accelerated rate following the liberation of Malaya from its Japanese Occupation during World War II. Huge numbers of refugees, poverty, an inefficient administration, and the growth of communism made Malaya ripe for social and political revolution.

On June 16, 1948, communist guerrillas (Communist Terrorists or CTs) began a campaign of terror attacks on the British planters and miners across the country. Their leadership was well versed in the doctrine of communist revolution and planned the campaign in advance. Most CTs had been trained by the British to fight as guerrillas against the Japanese. They progressively terrorized the country's labor force into supporting them and began to cripple the efforts of the local government.

The government responded quickly with a declaration of a state of emergency and began to formulate a strategy to defeat the insurgents. The British were farsighted enough to realize this was a different type of conflict from WW II.

"Any idea that the business of normal civil government and the business of the Emergency are two separate entities must be killed for good and all. The two activities are completely and utterly interrelated."

General Sir Gerald Templer ¹¹
High Commissioner of Malaya
February 1952

From the very outset, the British realized that the struggle was for the populace and not for a specific military objective. And although the original decision to retain civilian control of operations was made for insurance reasons, hence the term Emergency rather than war, it quickly became apparent that it was the correct choice. (General Templer held his position as a civilian.) This allowed the apparatus of civil government to continue to function and establish its own credibility.

"Government that not only functioned, but was seen to function, so that the births, marriages, and deaths still get registered. For this, as much as anything else, was the key to the changing fortunes."

Sir Robert Thompson ¹²
Secretary of Defense-Malaya

This philosophy of reinforcing the government with force when necessary but making it work was to become part of the entire fabric of Malayan Administration. This is legitimacy in action. In this example it is easy to see how the factors interrelate. Reinforcing civil organizations rather than substituting military ones for them demonstrated political dominance.

Established at the national level was an Emergency Operations Council, chaired by the Prime Minister (later the High Commissioner) and consisting of Ministers and Service Directors to integrate all policies for the overall conduct of the Emergency. This is referred to as an Area Control Center (ACC) in FM 100-20. The organization was duplicated at every regional and local level down to Joint Military-Police Operations Rooms. It underscored political dominance but also ensured unity of effort from the national level all the way down to the village council.¹³

Rather than merely bringing in British troops to combat the insurgents, the police force was expanded (eventually to reach more than five times its original size) and modernized. It included desegregation and integration, which eventually spread across the entire civil service system. This demonstrated that the populace could be protected by an effective civil police force and began to break the racial barriers and integrate a society in Malaya. It also effectively countered one of the main propaganda points of the CTs.

Adaptability was also a crucial factor as illustrated by the four main points of the Briggs Plan (General Sir Harold Briggs - First Director of Operations) authored in large part by Sir Robert Thompson. They were:

- ! To dominate the populated areas and to build up a feeling of complete security therein which will in time result in a steady flow of information coming in from all sources.
- ! To break up the communist organization within the populated areas.
- ! To isolate the bandits from their food and information supply organizations which are in the populated areas.
- ! To destroy the bandits by forcing them to attack us on our own ground.¹⁴

A critical element in accomplishing these points and an example of the innovation sometimes necessary was the New Village Program. This social revolution demonstrated the lengths to which the administration was willing to go and clearly illustrated they had perseverance and the long-term view in mind.

The program encompassed the movement and resettling of thousands of Chinese squatters, many of them refugees from the fringes of plantations and the jungle to new villages built specially for them. Police forces secured these villages which included land suitable for cultivation. The Chinese became land owners rather than squatters and were offered citizenship.

Although a prolonged and complex operation, it proved to be one of the most successful of the campaign. It secured a major portion of the populace and removed them as a source of support to the CTs. The plan incorporated these Chinese into Malayan society and gave them a stake in its success.

! This demonstration of concern and willingness to promote social change on the part of the government was also a tremendous propaganda defeat for the insurgents.

Several other innovative programs served to weaken the CT position and modernize the civil administration of Malaya. One was the National Registration Program. This involved the registration and identification of every individual in Malaya. In addition to serving as the basis for a rationing and population control system, it also served as the first national census. Although bitterly opposed by the CTs, a determined effort on the part of the civil administration with Police and Army support once again demonstrated the ability of the government and its commitment to the populace.

Finally, by establishing and arming a Home Guard, General Templer provided for the participation of the general populace in the struggle and increased local security, building the confidence and morale of the people. Initially a huge gamble, the Home Guard paid for itself by freeing regular troops and police for operations and also by further separating the CTs from their only sources of supply and recruits.

These are but a few of the many successful and innovative techniques the British used in Malaya to quell the Emergency. They effectively illustrate the five imperatives of LIC as well as outline the interdependent nature of them. It is important to note that many successful conventional military operations were carried out during the Emergency. However, they were carried out within the framework of larger political issues and not as a unilateral means to end the conflict.

! Without the successful political and social programs, it is doubtful that these military actions would have had any measurable effect on the outcome.

The historical example demonstrates that by approaching the imperatives of low intensity conflict as we do the principles of war, as a framework for all decisions, plans, and operations, the results will likely be more favorable.

Further examination of LIC requires an overview of the operational categories and a historical example of each.

OPERATIONAL CATEGORIES OF LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

There are four broad categories of operations in LIC: Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, Combating Terrorism, Peacekeeping Operations, and Peacetime Contingency Operations. Any conflict may involve one or more of these categories simultaneously.¹⁵

INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

The objective in insurgency is mobilizing the populace to support a revolution. In counterinsurgency, the objective is mobilization in support of the existing government and against the insurgent movement. Although the two are polar opposites, the same general principles apply and the actual application becomes a matter of who is being supported.¹⁶

Insurgency primarily involves Unconventional Warfare, or the organization, training, and support of guerrilla forces. This is normally done by a small number of selected trainers or a specially organized support organization. They can be a select group of conventional force officers and NCOs or a Special Forces Team organized by TO&E; for that purpose.

Psychological operations are also an integral part of support to any insurgency. They provide a means to mobilize the populace both politically and operationally in support of guerrilla operations. The PSYOP unit would develop campaigns to discredit the government and highlight its shortcomings.

The U.S. military has never undertaken an insurgency operation as the lead agency. An example can be drawn from the early days of the American Revolution when France, Germany, and Spain contributed in many ways to support the emerging colonial rebels in their conflict with England.

Counterinsurgency¹⁷ involves the full range of operations in support of a friendly foreign government. Nation building is a key operational concept. U.S. Forces operations should fit into an overall country plan which supports the established civil government. Normally the U.S. Ambassador orchestrates this plan and recommends the type of forces and operations which will be most effective.

U.S. Forces can be as limited as a small cadre designed to assist police or military training, or a large combat force to conduct direct operations against the insurgents. The latter is one of the least preferred options, because it causes direct U.S. involvement and begins to substitute U.S. military operations for those of the host nation government. A much more positive use of the same force, if the situation in the host country has not already become critical, is to deploy it on a combined training exercise in-country as a show of force. This demonstrates U.S. faith in the existing government and a resolve to assist if necessary. Example: British operations in Malaya, used earlier to illustrate the imperatives of LIC, illustrate the full range of successful counterinsurgency efforts.

COMBATING TERRORISM

Combating Terrorism includes all actions to protect installations, units, and individuals from the threat of terrorism. Combating terrorism includes both antiterrorism (AT) and counterterrorism (CT) actions throughout the entire spectrum of conflict. It is designed to provide coordinated action before, during, and after terrorist incidents. This includes both the passive measures associated with antiterrorism and the active measures of counterterrorism.

Antiterrorism involves the measures taken by installations, units or individuals to reduce the probability of their falling victim to a terrorist act. Educational programs, physical security, personal protection techniques, and operational patterns are all passive means of making a target less appealing to a terrorist.¹⁸ Example: Unannounced MP searches of cars entering installations.

Counterterrorism is the full range of offensive measures to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Participation in counterterrorist actions is normally limited to specially trained and equipped forces kept on alert status for that purpose.¹⁹ Example: The Israeli operation to rescue the airline passengers held hostage in Entebbe, Uganda during 1976.

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Peacekeeping Operations maintain peace already obtained through diplomatic efforts. A peacekeeping force supervises and implements a negotiated truce to which belligerent parties have agreed. A distinguishing feature of these operations is the prohibition against violence, limiting it to self defense only.²⁰ Example: The Multinational Force Observer (MFO) operations in the Sinai act as a buffer between forces which have negotiated a peace but require 3rd party assistance in maintaining and monitoring the separation of forces.

PEACETIME CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

Peacetime Contingency Operations are a rapid mobilization of effort to focus on a specific problem. This is usually during a crisis and guided at the national level by the crisis action system. These operations include such diverse actions as disaster relief, counter-drug ops, or land, sea, or air strikes. Operations may require the exercise of restraint and the selective use of force or concentrated violent actions²¹.

A wide array of options for U.S. Force employment exists. Limited in duration and focused on a specific objective, they do not always require combat operations as an integral element.

Examples: Operations BLAST FURNACE, URGENT FURY, and HAWKEYE.

Operation BLAST FURNACE was the 1986 aviation task force support of the Bolivian Narcotics Police involving 6 UH-60 helicopters with an accompanying support, security, and intelligence package. The mission was to assist in targeting and transport of the host country's assets to conduct raids on cocaine production facilities.

Operation URGENT FURY was the mission on the island of Grenada in 1983, to rescue American medical students and reduce Cuban influence. It was a violent, short-duration operation, oriented on an armed rescue and the immediate reduction of hostile forces. U.S. Forces were purposely tailored to achieve decisive results in a short time.

Operation HAWKEYE was the XVIII ABN Corps Task Force deployment to the island of St. Croix to assist local law enforcement following hurricane Hugo in 1989. The task force included command and control, military police, civil affairs, and medical personnel.

These examples illustrate the wide variety of operations, and that the specific objective should dictate the type of forces and required response rather than a predetermined formula for a standard response.

Operations can involve several categories simultaneously. This was the case during the air strike against Libya in retaliation for their earlier terrorist acts. By way of responding to an act of terrorism and to deter future acts, the U.S. conducted what could be viewed as a peacetime contingency operation involving a joint raid by conventional forces.

The preceding examples illustrate that LIC Operations can take many forms and require a variety of force structures. There are several common threads that run through all these actions. The following characteristics of LIC and some general lessons learned demonstrate this point.

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT LESSONS LEARNED

LOGISTICS

By nature, most LIC will occur in undeveloped Third World countries. Economies of the countries involved are limited and most probably fragile. An important concern becomes how to support the operation with as little disruptive impact as possible on the local economy. Existing CSS doctrine deals primarily with conventional operations in mid & high intensity conflicts. Commonly accepted support infrastructures may not exist locally. The ability to deploy necessary support packages are limited. Other avenues of support such as contracting, local procurement, and equipment rentals may have dramatic unforeseen consequences on the local economy. Distances between the U.S. and the host country and between the port of entry and the operational area combine to lengthen normal supply delivery times.

Lessons Learned

- ! Compile detailed estimates for all classes of supply before the operation.
- ! Conduct a pre-deployment site survey with logistics personnel.
- ! Do not make assumptions about the quality of materials and the presence of necessary components; i.e., additives for aviation fuel.
- ! If non-standard procurement actions are anticipated, make an analysis of their impact on the local economy and on the OPSEC program.
- ! Countries/Vendors may not share U.S. standards of sanitation for food items.
- ! Deploy well qualified procurement specialists as part of an advance party.
- ! Combat PLLs are critical; consider environmental factors (dust = filters, sharp rocks = tires) to increase quantities.
- ! Plan for redundancy of critical equipment to offset decreased repair and resupply capability.
- ! Plan for worst case medical supplies to cover emergencies or operations which may escalate.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Inherent in most LIC Operations is restraint on the use of firepower and violence. This concept is transformed into rules of engagement (ROE) at the tactical level. Instant response, combatant identification, junior leader execution, political volatility, and local customs add complexity and dimensions to ROE not normally encountered in conventional operations. Leaders and soldiers are often not trained for and are unfamiliar in dealing with this concept of restraint, no matter how well it is articulated. It can also rapidly and dramatically change, leaving soldiers confused if not properly prepared.

The consequences of violating ROE escalate quickly into the world arena. This fact, together with difficulty in transforming the ROE into an instantaneous decision/response, make them a priority for careful development and concentrated training.

Lessons Learned

- ! ROE must be well written in terms that soldiers can understand. Outline them in a positive manner through the commander's intent, stressing how they contribute to mission success.
- ! ROE are an immediate priority for rehearsals and situational training exercises (STX).
- ! Include nontraditional members of the Battle Staff, Chap, JAG, Civil Affairs, & PSYOP. Encourage them to apply their functional skills in developing, training, and maintaining ROE.
- ! Ingrained soldier skills; battle drills; i.e, immediately return fire if fired upon, will often be counterproductive.

COMMUNICATIONS

LIC Operations are often joint with the possible incompatibility in communication equipment, Standard Operating Procedures, and Communications/Electronics Operating Instructions. Rapid communications (internal & external), often to the National Command Authority, will be the lifeblood of the operation.

Lessons Learned

- ! Conduct detailed comms planning before deployment and coordinate across the entire task force.
- ! Plan for liaison officers with required comms & CEOI to overcome problems with inter/intraservice operations especially during short missions.
- ! Redundant equipment provides for slower repair and the ability to monitor additional nets.
- ! Coordinate for common user nets and power requirements which could simplify unnecessary redundancy during deployment.
- ! Distribute common message formats and reports well in advance and rehearse if possible. (JINTACCS)
- ! Clearly define time sharing and procedures for critical nets, especially Satellite Communications-Facsimile.

INTELLIGENCE

IPB for LIC Operations is critical but differs in many respects from techniques used for the conventional battlefield. Non-military information, i.e. civilian trends, is as important as operational information. Doctrinal templates for guerrillas, surrogates, and narcotics production facilities do not exist. Different collection techniques and entirely different background information is required. HUMINT, CounterIntel, and interfacing with the host country are critical. Additionally, the ability to access and utilize national level assets may be an integral part of the mission.

Lessons Learned

- ! Interagency cooperation is absolutely essential. Establish rapport and exchange LNOs early.
- ! Evaluate intelligence requirements early on.
- ! Train personnel in force protection requirements and the use of non-standard and national level assets (especially HUMINT).
- ! Make provisions to interface with host country intelligence sources (military & civilian).
- ! Determine what information is suitable for exchange with host country forces and the processing requirements.
- ! Make everyone in the task force knowledgeable of intelligence collection requirements.
- ! Cultivate local nations as intel assets, but always remember OPSEC and maintain a healthy skepticism.
- ! Identify language qualified soldiers.
- ! Civil Affairs units may not be available.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES (SOF)

SOF units are area oriented and often conduct recurring missions into the same area of operations. They can provide a great deal of information to conventional units and can often conduct mutually beneficial operations. Their language training and knowledge of local customs can be invaluable in establishing contact and maintaining rapport with government forces or the local populace.

Lessons Learned

- ! Establish contact with the SOF unit responsible for the area of operations.
- ! Use their institutional memory and current operations to update the intel data base.
- ! Coordinate for mutual support operations.
- ! Request area orientation training by SOF.
- ! Discuss oplans of conventional forces: ensure they dovetail with SOF to avoid duplication of effort. Plan/coordinate SOF augmentation of conventional forces for combat and non-hostile operations.
- ! The Security Assistance Organization (SAO), if present, can also be a major source of institutional knowledge and advice.

HOST COUNTRY RELATIONS

Any perception of the "ugly American" will immediately interfere with operational success. U.S. Forces must not reinforce negative propaganda with a superior attitude and harsh treatment of local citizens. Improper conduct (rowdiness, drinking, approaching women) will have a poor effect on the populace. This detracts from the efforts of legitimacy by taking away from U.S.-host country credibility.

Lessons Learned

- ! Be aware of the local cultural perception of U.S. presence: To exploit and dominate. Often the host nation will demonstrate their independence from the U.S., even when the interests coincide.
- ! Civil Affairs personnel are critical. Deploy with a language qualified 5-5 section.
- ! Go out of your way to treat local military as equals. Train soldiers in insignia recognition.
- ! Soldiers must understand that one incident can destroy rapport which took years to build.

ENGINEERS

Engineer construction projects play a major role in LIC by assisting our allied governments to develop a strong infrastructure, which in turn, builds economic growth and stability. Some examples of engineer projects include road and airfield construction, well drilling, and humanitarian projects such as school and hospital construction or renovation.

Lessons Learned

- ! Order materials early in the planning process.
- ! The planning staff must be mobilized early and stabilized through the duration of the project.
- ! Quality assurance is vital. The reputation of the U.S. and host country relies on sound design and construction to standard.
- ! Quarry opns demand careful planning and execution for successful horizontal construction.
- ! Construction standards must be clearly understood (U.S. vs. host nation) early on. Foreign contractor performance varies widely.
- ! Base camp and worksite security is paramount to force protection. Consider host nation support.
- ! Contractors must provide tech advisors to deploy with leased commercial equipment.

These are merely a few lessons learned which apply to LIC. Future bulletins will include more detailed tactical subjects.

CONCLUSION

"The services for the last forty years have concentrated on deterring military conflict and the 'big' war on the plains of Europe. That focus has worked; we have avoided both. But what we have failed to deter is low intensity conflict . . . And the strategic thinkers tell us that this is the most likely form of conflict for the rest of this century. Thus, we are well prepared for the least likely conflicts and poorly prepared for the most likely."

Congressman Dan Daniel²²
August 1985

Overcoming this void in our doctrine and training will take a concerted effort on everyone's part. There are few absolute formulas or rules which will work under all circumstances. LIC requires analysis and thought rather than a checklist application of a school solution.

Additionally, LIC presents a bewildering array of unique and challenging training requirements. Many of these requirements will diametrically oppose training the unit for conventional operations.

- The tendency to take the expedient approach and focus on the far right of the LIC spectrum, Peacetime Contingency Operations and conduct training as usual, while briefing that the LIC block has been checked, will lead us to a possibly fatal false sense of security.

Instinctive behavior and ingrained training must be adjusted to fit new circumstances. STXs must be developed locally or borrowed from units who have already been through the training.

The probability of becoming involved in a LIC operation is high. The potential to attract international attention, even with limited forces, is also great. Units have demonstrated that with a balanced training focus and proper preparation, many pitfalls outlined above can be avoided.

ENDNOTES

1. Col. David Hale, Private interview held at Ft. Ord, Ca., November 1989.
2. FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, p. vi.
3. Ibid., p. 1-1.
4. Provided by the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict (A-AF CLIC) from FM 100-1 (DRAFT), The Army, December, 1989.
5. The Commission on Integrated Long Term Strategy, Discriminate Deterrence, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1988), p. 16.
6. FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, p. 1-8.
7. Ibid., p. 1-8.
8. Ibid., p. 1-9.
9. Ibid, p. 1-9.
10. Ibid., p. 1-9.
11. Noel Barber, The War of the Running Dogs, (New York, Bantam Books, 1987), p. 150.
12. Ibid., p. 194.
13. FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, p. 2-19 - 2-21.
14. Julian Paget, Counter-Insurgency Operations: Techniques of Guerrilla Warfare, (New York, Walker and Company, 1967) p. 56-57.
15. FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, p. 1-10.
16. Ibid., p. 2-2.
17. Ibid., p. 1-10.
18. Ibid., p. 3-19 - 3-20.
19. Ibid., p. 3-19 - 3-20.
20. Ibid., p. 1-11.
21. Ibid., p. 1-11.
22. Dan Daniel, "The Case For A Sixth Service," Armed Forces Journal, (August, 1985), p. 73-75.